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OVERVIEW — In order to facilitate a better understanding of the complex
issues raised by the current Senate and House proposals to establish a pre-
scription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries, this paper briefly addresses
some fundamentals of the health insurance market, defines key risk-sharing
mechanisms, including risk corridors and reinsurance, and identifies the rel-
evant risk provisions in the bills. Other issues related to cost management
strategies and program design, which may have an impact on cost and adverse
selection, are briefly discussed.
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Efforts to add a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program have
intensified in recent months. Though many agree on the importance of find-
ing a way to provide what has become a critical component of medical
treatment to our nation’s seniors, much disagreement remains about how
this should be achieved. In late June, the House and Senate passed their
respective versions of a Medicare prescription drug benefit plan.1 Although
different in significant and numerous ways, the two bills share a reliance
on private entities to provide drug coverage for seniors. These entities in-
clude both comprehensive health plans and stand-alone drug plans.
This reliance raises concerns about the appropriate structure of a benefit
that will need to appeal to a wide range of seniors, not just those with
significant prescription drug needs, and to insurers, who will be wary of
offering a new benefit in the face of unknown demand and the risks of
adverse selection. What incentives are needed to encourage private plans
to participate? How will the risk concerns differ for comprehensive health
plans and stand-alone drug plans? What are the likely effects of the vari-
ous risk arrangements on plans, the government, and Medicare benefi-
ciaries? Will risk corridors, reinsurance, or a combination of both best
serve the interests of the various stakeholders? What role will prescrip-
tion drug cost-management strategies play? Resolving these and other
questions will be key to assuring the viability of a meaningful drug ben-
efit for Medicare beneficiaries.
HEALTH INSURANCE BASICS
The possibility of facing extremely costly medical bills and the financial
consequences that could follow lead most individuals to seek the protec-
tion offered by some form of health insurance. In addition to protecting
individuals from the high cost of health care services, health insurance
also assures greater access to such services.2
Health coverage is available through a variety of sources, both private
and public, including employers, Medicare, Medicaid, federal and state
employee plans, the military, and the Veterans Administration. The most
significant source of private health insurance is employer-sponsored cov-
erage, which covers more than 160 million people.3 Small employers of-
fering coverage typically opt to insure through an outside health insurer.
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In contrast, large employers are more likely to self-insure their employ-
ees, paying directly for their employees’ health care services and assum-
ing the risk for the associated costs. Individuals without access to em-
ployer-sponsored coverage may purchase coverage in the individual
market, either directly or through a group purchasing arrangement.
By grouping a large number of individuals with different levels of ex-
pected health care needs, an arrangement referred to as risk pooling, health
insurance providers can spread the cost of high-claims cases. This makes
premiums more affordable than they would otherwise be.4 Costs for larger
groups tend to have less variation, making them more predictable. This
is due, in large part, to the sheer size of these plans and to the high pro-
portion of employees that enroll in a plan. When an insured pool does
not reflect the health status of the general population but instead results
in one in poorer-than-average health, adverse selection has occurred.5 Pools
with sicker individuals will have higher premiums (reflecting their higher
costs), which in turn will likely result in healthier individuals seeking
lower-cost alternatives. Consequently, insurers try to avoid adverse se-
lection by retaining or attracting low-cost subscribers. In this way, they
are able to maintain competitive premiums for the entire pool.
Some experts argue that concerns about adverse selection are even greater
for the provision of a prescription drug benefit for the Medicare popula-
tion because of seniors’ ability to predict these costs. Most prescription
drug spending by the elderly is for the treatment of chronic diseases,
making such spending predictable and persistent.6 Seniors, armed with
this spending information, are better able to make coverage decisions
based on their expected costs, which may lead only those with the high-
est expected costs to seek coverage.
RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS
The lack of experience private entities have with predicting the costs of
this new benefit may lead them to set premiums too low. Such inaccurate
rate-setting can result in significant losses for the private entities and/or
for the federal government. Various mechanisms can be used to limit the
risk or spread the risk between the insurer and/or the government. While
insurance shields individuals from the high cost of medical services, risk-
sharing mechanisms serve to limit the risk exposure of insurers and gov-
ernment. Discussed below are mechanisms included in the two congres-
sional proposals.
Reinsurance
Similar to the protection offered by insurance to individuals, reinsurance
provides some level of protection to the primary insurer by taking on some
portion of the risk that it has assumed. Primary insurers pay a premium to
the reinsurers in exchange for protection against higher-than-expected
Most prescription drug
spending by the elderly
is for the treatment of
chronic diseases, mak-
ing such spending pre-
dictable and persistent.
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claims.7 Given the potential for extremely high costs, reinsurance pre-
miums can be quite expensive. These high premiums and some ability to
spread the risk enable reinsurers to take on much greater risk. Reinsur-
ance is very prevalent in the commercial market. The most common types
of reinsurance are aggregate reinsurance and individual reinsurance.8
Aggregate reinsurance protects an insurer from some of the risk associ-
ated with an insured group. Reinsurance protection is triggered if total
claims for a group exceed a certain threshold. Individual reinsurance limits
an insurer’s exposure for claims above a certain level for each covered
individual.9 For example, individual reinsurance coverage may reimburse
the primary insurer for 80 percent of the claim costs incurred by an indi-
vidual above $20,000 for a specified time period. Unlike aggregate rein-
surance, however, individual reinsurance does not protect insurers from
aggregate losses that occur below the defined threshold. So, while an in-
surer may not have an individual enrollee who reaches the threshold that
would trigger individual reinsurance payments, it may have a large num-
ber of enrollees who incur significant expenses below that threshold, cre-
ating unexpected aggregate losses.
The ability of primary insurers to reinsure provides a safeguard for greater
affordability and availability of insurance coverage. Without protection
from claims costs well in excess of premiums, insurers—and self-insured
employers—could suffer considerable losses. The threat of such losses
could affect insurers’ decisions regarding benefit offerings and could dis-
courage employers from self-insuring. Furthermore, reinsurance protects
the financial solvency of insurers, particularly those that are smaller or
are just starting up. Reinsurance could play a critical role in the establish-
ment of a Medicare prescription drug benefit, given the lack of experi-
ence insurers will have in providing a drug benefit to this population.
Reinsurance provisions in both the Senate and House proposals are dis-
cussed in a later section.
Risk Corridors
Risk corridors are another mechanism for limiting the losses experienced
by an insurer. Risk corridors are centered on a target point that typically
represents the total amount of annual premiums paid to an insurer (ex-
cluding administrative costs). Gains or losses within a given percentage
above or below that target point are assumed by the insurer. Gains or
losses beyond that established risk corridor are shared by the insurer and
the payer.10
For example, if the target amount were set at $10,000, and a plan assumed
full risk for costs 10 percent above or below that amount, a plan would
keep the gains if costs totaled $9,000 to $10,000 and would assume the
losses if they totaled $10,000 to $11,000. If costs fell below $9,000, the gains
would be shared between the plan and the payer in defined percentages,
and if costs exceeded $11,000, the losses would be shared.
The ability of primary
insurers to reinsure pro-
vides a safeguard for
greater affordability
and availability of in-
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Risk Adjusters
Risk adjusters, while not technically a risk-sharing mechanism, compen-
sate insurers based on the expected health risk of the individuals they
enroll, thereby creating a more accurate payment mechanism.11 Demo-
graphic factors, including age, gender, occupation, and Medicaid eligi-
bility, reflect overall health patterns in the general population and may
be used to project expected health care costs of an individual.12 Risk ad-
justment based on diagnostic information, which looks at a beneficiary’s
diagnosis in one year and predicts expected costs for the following year,
may also be used. Diagnostic information can be determined through the
collection of data that document an individual’s encounters with the health
care system. By compensating plans that have enrollees who are in poorer
health and have higher costs, risk adjusters provide some protection
against adverse selection. Risk adjusters therefore reduce incentives for
plans to avoid high-cost enrollees.
S. 1 AND H.R. 1 RISK-SHARING APPROACHES
Senate Approach
The Senate proposal, the Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement
Act of 2003 (S.1), would combine the use of risk corridors, reinsurance,
and risk adjusters to encourage private entities to participate in the Medi-
care prescription drug market. Risk corridors would be established around
a target amount that is based on total plan premiums (less administrative
costs). Private entities would assume full risk for costs up to 2.5 percent
above the established target amount. They would assume 25 percent risk
for costs between 2.5 percent and 5 percent above the target amount, and
10 percent risk for costs exceeding 5 percent above the target amount.13
(See Figure 1.) While a plan’s risk would be limited, so too would its
gains if costs were lower than expected. If a plan’s costs fell below the
target amount, it would be required to share the gains with the govern-
ment in percentages that mirror the risk sharing.
To compensate for the lack of plan experience in providing a prescription
drug benefit to Medicare eligibles, the risk corridors would expose plans
to lower levels of risk in the first two years (2006 and 2007). Between 2008
and 2011, however, these corridors would expand, requiring plans to as-
sume more risk. Full risk for costs within 5 percent (above or below) of
the established target amount would be borne by the plans (Figure 1).
Beginning in 2012, the administrator charged with overseeing the new
program would set the risk thresholds, which could not be lower than
those in place between 2008 and 2011.14
In addition to the protection offered by risk corridors, the Senate pro-
posal includes an individual reinsurance provision. The reinsurance pro-
tection offered under the Senate bill (and the House bill), however, is not
Risk adjusters reduce
incentives for plans
to avoid high-cost en-
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traditional reinsurance as described earlier. The federal government would
serve as the reinsurer and no premium would be collected in exchange for
this protection. Plans would receive payments equal to 80 percent of the
costs they incur for providing drug coverage for each individual who ex-
ceeds the annual out-of-pocket limit ($3,700 for 2006).15 Calculation of these
costs would not include administrative costs, the costs of providing addi-
tional benefits, or any rebates or other discounts received by a plan.16 Spon-
sors of retiree prescription drug plans and states offering pharmaceutical
assistance programs would also be eligible for reinsurance payments for
covered individuals, provided the coverage met certain requirements,
including actuarial equivalence with the standard coverage offered by
participating plans.17
FIGURE 1
Risk Corridors from the Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003 (S. 1),
2006–2007 and 2008–2011
S. 1 Risk Corridor, 2006–2007
S. 1 Risk Corridor, 2008–2011
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The Senate proposal would grant to the administrator the authority to
create a methodology for adjusting payments to plans to take into ac-
count cost variations based on the differences in risk of different enroll-
ees.18 The administrator would be required to publish risk adjusters on
an annual basis.
Plans would also have the ability under the Senate proposal to employ
cost-control mechanisms to manage utilization and spending. The pro-
posal states that plans “may use a variety of cost-control mechanisms,
including the use of formularies, tiered copayments, selective contract-
ing with providers of prescription drugs, and mail order pharmacies.”19
The proposal outlines a series of requirements for the development and
application of formularies to protect beneficiary access.
House Approach
The House proposal, the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization
Act of 2003 (H.R.1), would rely on individual reinsurance (risk corridors
are not included) to attract private plans into the Medicare prescription
drug arena. (Again, the federal government would provide reinsurance
payments and no premium would be collected from plans, distinguish-
ing this approach from traditional reinsurance.) Reinsurance payments
would be tiered and would include payments equal to (a) 20 percent of
an enrollee’s prescription drug costs between $1,001 and $2,000 (in 2006)
and (b) 80 percent of costs above the out-of-pocket limit ($3,500 in 2006).20
In addition, the House proposal includes a cap on reinsurance payments
that would limit payments to 30 percent of a plan’s aggregate spending
on prescription drugs for standard coverage.21 Reinsurance payments
would also be available to sponsors of retiree prescription drug plans
that are actuarially equivalent to standard coverage.22
As noted earlier, individual reinsurance insulates insurers from poten-
tially high-cost enrollees, but it does little to shield them from significant
aggregate costs. The 30 percent aggregate cap may only heighten this
concern for plans.
The House proposal would give the administrator the authority to risk-
adjust plan payments if appropriate to avoid risk selection,23 but risk ad-
justment is not required as it is in the Senate proposal. Similar to the Sen-




In addition to the risk-sharing mechanisms described above, there are other
factors that may play an important role in reducing cost and limiting ad-
verse selection associated with the provision of a prescription drug benefit
H.R.1 would rely on in-
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to Medicare beneficiaries. Of particular significance are prescription drug
cost-management mechanisms and program design issues.
Prescription Drug Cost-Management Mechanisms
Private entities’ willingness to offer an affordable prescription drug ben-
efit to Medicare beneficiaries will depend, in large part, on their ability to
manage beneficiary utilization and spending. Efforts to eliminate, or even
limit, this ability may deter plans from assuming the risk associated with
this benefit. Both the Senate and House proposals would allow plans to
use cost-management mechanisms, among which are formularies, ben-
eficiary cost sharing, and tiered copayments. These strategies are com-
monly used in the private market and in Medicaid.24 Consumer advo-
cates have expressed concern about the level of discretion plans would
have in designing their coverage under these proposals and the impact
this discretion would have on beneficiary access. Below is a brief descrip-
tion of some of the strategies that plans may use.
Formularies — A formulary is a list of prescription drugs approved by a
plan to be dispensed to patients. Such lists include drugs within each
therapeutic class and are used to steer physicians and patients to the most
cost-effective drugs.25 Typically, patients who need access to drugs not
listed on a formulary are required to obtain prior authorization or file an
appeal to have the drug covered. Beneficiaries may factor a plan’s formu-
lary into their decision when looking at which plan to join. If a plan’s
formulary does not include a drug, or drugs, critical to their care, they
may opt to join a plan with a formulary that does.
Cost Sharing/Tiered Copayments — Both proposals would grant plans
the flexibility to determine beneficiary cost sharing, which may be as-
sessed through deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance. Cost sharing
reduces, to some extent, the potential for overutilization and unneces-
sary use of prescription drugs by placing some financial responsibility on
the beneficiary. The appropriate level of cost sharing, however, will likely
be the subject of considerable debate.
Tiered copayments would be permitted under both the Senate and House
proposals. These copayments are typically linked to a plan’s formulary
and are structured to tie lower cost sharing to preferred drugs and higher
cost sharing to nonpreferred drugs. Tiered copayments may also be tied
to generic and brand name drugs, with higher cost sharing for the more
costly brand name drugs. Tiering serves to make beneficiaries more aware
of the true cost of prescription drugs and therefore encourages the use of
less costly alternatives.
Mail Order Pharmacy — By eliminating the costs associated with retail
pharmacies and achieving savings through negotiated prices with whole-
salers and manufacturers, the use of mail order programs can be an effec-
tive cost-management tool.26 Mail order can be used only for medications
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for chronic conditions. However, given the large percentage of Medicare
beneficiaries with one or more chronic conditions, mail order may offer a
convenient and cost-effective alternative for seniors. Both proposals would
allow the use of mail order pharmacies.
Pharmacy Networks — These are groups of pharmacies with which the
entity providing coverage has entered a contract. By contracting with a
more limited number of pharmacies, greater discounts can be negotiated
in exchange for volume.27 Beneficiaries purchasing their prescription drugs
from an in-network, or “preferred” pharmacy, will typically pay a smaller
copayment. Both proposals would place limits on the use of networks.
The House bill includes “any willing pharmacy” language that would
require entities offering prescription drug coverage to permit the partici-
pation of any pharmacy that meets the plan’s terms.28
Program Design Issues
Many features of the program’s design are likely to play a role in increas-
ing or decreasing adverse selection.
Plan Enrollment — The process by which seniors will have to enroll in a
new prescription drug program will be important. The more administra-
tively burdensome the process becomes for seniors, the less likely they
are to participate; this is particularly true for those with lower expected
prescription drug costs. Automatic enrollment, as occurs for Medicare
Part B, would increase the number of participants, thereby reducing the
risk of adverse selection.
Penalties for Delayed Enrollment — Such penalties would create an
incentive for seniors to enroll during their initial enrollment period. Fail-
ure to enroll during this time would result in financial penalties for indi-
viduals who enroll at a later time (unless they have had creditable drug
coverage in the interim). These penalties entice beneficiaries to enroll while
they are still in good health rather than waiting until their need for pre-
scription drugs is greater. Both proposals would include penalties for
delayed enrollment.29
Administrative Costs — Inherent in any calculation of the risk of provid-
ing a new benefit will be the administrative costs. A new Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit will likely involve a new federal agency, a new
administrator, and a new set of regulations. Plans are likely to assess these
costs, which could include maintaining and reporting detailed informa-
tion related to benefits, costs, and drug prices (including all discounts
and/or rebates); providing consumer education materials; and internal
processes, such as appeals.
These design issues, and others, will need to be well thought out to en-
sure the appropriate mix of enrolled beneficiaries. If the offered plans
appeal only to those in the greatest need of prescription drugs, healthier
beneficiaries, as well as insurers, will be hesitant to participate.
Inherent in any calcu-
lation of the risk of pro-
viding a new benefit
will be the administra-
tive costs.
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The design of the benefit to reduce the risk of adverse selection, coupled
with plans’ flexibility to use cost-management tools, will be important in
determining the willingness of beneficiaries in good health to enroll in
the program. If the premium amount and the various cost-sharing re-
quirements are too high, those beneficiaries who expect to be low utiliz-
ers of prescription drugs may forgo coverage and instead continue to pay
out-of-pocket for their drug needs. Conversely, those beneficiaries with
expected prescription drug costs greater than the cost of the prescription
drug benefit will enroll.
CONCLUSION
The proposals that have emerged in the past two months have prompted
significant discussion and debate about the many complex issues involved
in creating a Medicare prescription drug benefit. Beneficiaries await a
program that will ensure them access to and affordability of prescription
drugs. Private entities seek protection from adverse selection and the
potential consequences of providing this new benefit to the Medicare
population. How these goals should be achieved, however, remains elu-
sive as policymakers are faced with more questions than answers.
Among the critical questions facing policymakers are the following:
■ What are the likely effects of the various risk arrangements on plans,
the government, and Medicare beneficiaries?
■ How should the benefit be designed in order to reduce the risk of
adverse selection?
■ How much risk might be eliminated by each of the mechanisms
used in S. 1 and H.R. 1, including risk corridors, reinsurance, and risk
adjusters?
■ How will the risk concerns differ for comprehensive health plans and
stand-alone drug plans? Are risk concerns heightened when drug-only
plans compete against plans that provide more comprehensive cover-
age? How can these concerns be alleviated?
■ What is the administrative burden associated with each of these risk
arrangements? How will this burden factor into a plan’s assessment of
whether or not to participate in the Medicare prescription drug program?
■ How effective will prescription drug cost-saving mechanisms (for
example, formularies and mail order) be in controlling utilization and
spending?
■ What will be the impact of increased demand induced by the avail-
ability of new coverage?
■ What will be the long-term government costs?
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